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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
J. T. CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff and Respondent~ \~
vs.
R. W. SIMS,
Defend:;t and Appellant, ( No. 9554

MARGARET S. CHAMBERS, )
Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
J. T. CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant~
vs.
R. ,iV. SIMS,
Defendant and Respondent.

No. 9556

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT R. W. SIMS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
It is clear that neither plaintiff J. T. Chambers nor
defendant R. W. Sims agrees with the disposition of
the case made by the District Court. Each of them has
appealed from the judgment.
The trial court attempted to create a contract for
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which neither party contended at any itme, which is
utterly inconsistent with the Certificate of Limited
Partnership dated May 8, 1948, Exhibit 11-D, and
contrary to the express contentions of the parties set
forth in their Agreement for Dissolution of Partnership dated August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D, and the
admissions of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers. There was no
consideration nor any meeting of the minds of the
partners for such judicially created "implied contract"
for "reasonable compensation for the services of plaintiff" and "no compensation for services of defendant."
While defendant disagrees with most of the content
of the Brief of Plaintiff J. T. Chambers, defendant
concurs in that pottion of plaintiff's contention on page
39 which states that "it was error for the Court to consider further evidence on the issue of reasonableness."
Before the introduction ofany evidence it was expressly
agreed between the court and counsel that '""the matter
of reasonableness is not an issue in the case.-"' The judgment assailed on this appeal is chiefly predicated on
such error of the trial court. Plaintiff seeks the benefit
of such admitted error. Plaintiff complains that the trial
court "only went half way."
Plaintiff's contentions in his brief are contrary to
the record and contrary to law, as this reply brief is
designed to illustrate.
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO CONTROVERT
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Brief of Plaintiff does not comply with Rule
7 5 ( p) ( 2) which requires a respondent, if he controverts
appellant's statement of facts, to "state wherein such
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statement is inconsistent with the facts" and to "make
a statemenet of the facts as he finds them, giving reference to the pages of the record supporting his statement
and contraverting appellant's statement."
Counsel for plaintiff does not point out any error
in the Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of
Defendant and Appellant R. W. Sims. Plaintiff attempts to brush aside all of the essential facts including
the fatal admissions of plaintiff and cross-defendant by
saying that "The Statement of Facts made by appellant
at pages 2 to 10 is rejected in its entirety." Plaintiff
says that defendant "ignores the evidence of plaintiff,"
but does not say what evidence. Most of the facts stated
by defendant are those which came from the lips of
plaintiff John T. Chambers and cross-defendant Margaret S. Chambers, his wife, or facts which were corroborated by their solemn admissions.
Instead of making any statement of ,facts, on page
5 of his brief plaintiff says that "The facts before this
Court are primarily those stated by the court in its
memorandum decisions and found by the court in its
findings of fact." VVe disagree. While the trial court
made some correct findings, the court based most of its
findings on incompetent evidence, disregarded the admitted agreements between plaintiff and defendant, the
express admissions of plaintiff and his wife, and most
of the other undisputed evidence including the stipulations of counsel. We take no issue with the cases cited
on page 6 of the Brief of Plaintiff. Those cases, however,
do not even suggest that findings of fact can be predicated on incompetent evidence, nor that the court can
refuse to make findings in accordance with the undis-
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puted competent and material evidence, nor create a
new contract for the parties which was incompatible with
all of their agreements and discussions, nor make some
findings which are directly contrary to the evidence,
as occurred in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO SALARY HAVING BEEN PAID TO
EITHER PARTNER, THERE WAS NO
"PRACTICE OF PAYMENT," AND THERE
COULD NOT ARISE ANY "IMPLIED CONTRACT TO PAY COMPENSATION TO
PLAINTIFF AND DENY COMPENSATION
TO DEFEND.i\..NT.
This is not a case where a salary has ever been paid
to either partner. This case is not in point at all with
the line of cases which holds that where a salary has
regularly been paid by the partners to one of the part~
ners over a long period of time, an agreement can be
implied from such established practice to pay such
salary to such partner. Plaintiff cites some cases involving payment of salary to a partner, and then on page
16 of his brief claims that Shulkin v. ShulkinJ 301 Mass.
184, 16 N.E. 2d 644, 118 A.L.R. 629, "is similar to the
principal case." That case involved a long practice of
regular salary paJpments to partners other than the
complaining partner. The complaining partner admitted there was an agreement for payment of salaries
to the other partners, and he acknowledged that he had
actual notice of salary payments, but he claimed he was
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not aware of the precise amount. lie said he understood
that the other partners "were to draw enough to live on."
The Shulkin case as quite dissimilar.
The controversy in this case arises over the unauthorized undisclosed bookkeeping entries and omissions made by plaintiff's wife, none of which entries
were ever paid either prior to dissolution, nor under
the Agreement for Dissolution of Partnership dated
August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D. By said agreement
the plaintiff and defendant stipulated on a tentative
equal division of the assets but no payment of salary
to either partner, subject to the right of each partner
to an accounting and a right to litigate their disputed
claims.
Plaintiff does not cite any competent evidence to
support his contention of a "practice" by the partners,
but merely refers to the erroneous Finding of Fact
No.7 whereby the trial court declared that "the practice
was established, of which defendant had reasonable
notice, of compensating plaintiff for full-time services,
and allowing defendant nothing for his services to the
partnership . . . " (R. 185-186. Ab. 320-322). The
term "compensate" means to "remunerate" or to "pay."
There is not only a lack of any competent evidence of
payment of any salary to either general partner, but
the evidence is conclusive that no salary was paid at any
time to either Mr. Sims or to Mr. Chambers.
Although Mrs. Chambers issued nearly all of the
checks over a period of nearly 12 years, at no time during the operation of the partnership nor under the
agreement for dissolution of the partnership was any
check ever issued either to John T. Chambers or
5
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to R. W. Sims for "salary" or remuneration for
services." Mrs. Chambers testified that "various sums
of money" were paid at "various times at irregular
intervazsn to Mr. Sims and to Mr.Chambers upon request, just as they needed money. (R. 691, 974-978.
Ab. 77, 110). She said "There was no regular withdrawals or payments made to either partner"; that bills
were paid out of the partnership bank account for each
of the partners; and that payments were made "just as
each partner needed money":
Q. And that was true with respect to each of the
partners?

A. That's right.
Q. So there was never any pattern set up as to a
certain amount being ·withdrawn even for
your own salary on a particular date, was
there?

A. That's right. (R. 722-723. Ab. 83).
The J. T. Chambers memorandum "capital account" sheet now appearing in the ledger, Exhibit 1-P,
on which the unauthorized "salary" entries appear,
was not prepared until1955, and the "blue worksheets"
which previously appeared "were thrown away." Such
changes were made by Mr. Evans on instructions from
Mrs. Chambers. (R. 1188-1193. Ab. 143). Mrs. Chambers admitted that the "salary" entries for her husband
which appear in the ledger, and the omission of salary
entries for Mr. Sims were her own decisions and made
without instructions from or consultation with either
partner, and that she never told Mr. Sims about them;
that those entries had gone on for a period of years
"before there was any discovery made of those entries''

6
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and when Mr. Sims found out about them he became
very angry. (R. 715, 721. Ab. 82-83).
Counsel for the Chambers at the opening of trial
admitted that those "salary" entries were never paid.
Neither partner ever reported on his Federal or State
income tax that he had ever been paid a "'salaryn by
the partnership. It appears that all of the entries were
made either during or since 1955, and some entries
were back-dated to prior years. As pointed out hereafter, neither partner found out about those unauthorized, secret, undisclosed "salary" entries at least until
October 1958. Consequently, the argument of plaintiff
that there was a "practice of compensating" .J. T.
Chambers for full-time services, and a practice of the
partners not to compensate R. W. Sims, is not only
misleading, but it disputes the record. Furthermore
statements that Chambers was "allowed" the "salaries"
shown in the books, when neither partner knew about
them, are also unfounded, for they could not be "allowed" by the partners until they knew about them
and until both approved them, which never occurred.
On page 13 of his brief plaintiff makes the unfounded argument that the court held that "the bookkeeping entries established the salaries" and inferentially established a right to the unauthorized salaries
noted in the records, "except for the confidential relationship existing between the cross-defendant and defendant, which required a more complete and specific
disclosure than the acquiescence or adoption which
resulted from general practices." As illustrated under
Points 3 and 4 of this Reply Brief there was neither a
plea nor proof nor finding of any "acquiescence or
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adoption"; and the unauthorized entries appearing in
the books were not the practices of the partners. The
court found by Finding of Facts No. 10 that there was
not sufficient disclosure of the salary entries made by
Mrs. Chambers in favor of her husband to become binding on defendant Sims. Consequently, the finding
necessarily implies that the entries were unauthorized
and that such unauthorized entries did not establish
salary for Chambers on the books. Furthermore, plaintiff overlooks the fact that only the partners themselves
had any authority to establish partners' salaries, and
that neither the plaintiff's wife nor a bookkeeper could
divest the partners of that right.
As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals
in Aron v. Gillman, 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. 2d 284,
287, parties are not bound by incorrect figures appearing
in the books:
"Thus the very purpose of an audit is to verify
and reconcile the book entries of a business according to proper accounting practice, and to
see that they are accurate ...
" ... Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that we
should take the inventory figure at $12,001.15
simply because it is the figure appearing on the
books, and despite the fact that it is concededly
erroneous. We are not obliged to follow blindly
entries in books that are indisputably untrue .. "
The same applies to. entries which are unauthorized.
It could not be successfully argued that unauthorized
entries are correct entries.
Plaintiff purportedly filed this suit for a "partnership accounting," as permitted by law and as permitted
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by Exhibit 10-D, the Agreement for Dissolution of
Partnership, dated August 17, 1959; but the purpose
of the action by plaintiff was not partnership accounting at all, for plaintiff has never attempted to comply
with the principles or rules of partnership accounting
which require a party who claims a credit to prove that
he is entitled to the credit he claims. Instead, plaintiff
actually filed this action to reap the unearned benefits
of unauthorized secret salary entries made in favor of
plaintiff by his wife, and to reap the benefit of the
omission of any salary entries for the defendant Sims.
Plaintiff never did prove that he was entitled to the
salary entries, for his own proof conclusively established
the fact that they were unauthorized by the partners
and that the entries and omissions were the bookkeeping
manipulations caused by plaintiff's wife in violation
of her fiduciary duties to her trusting brother R. W.
Sims.
Plaintiff's so-called "accounting" is not in evidence. Plaintiff's accountant, David N. Beal, purported to make an "audit" at the request of Mrs. Chambers in 1955, and again in 1960. His testimony shows
that he did not attempt to "verify and reconcile the
book entries" or "to see that they are accurate." He
testified that he "assumed" that the entries were correct.
He even "assumed" that "salaries" had been "paid."
He even assumed the functions of a lawyer to "interpret" the Certificate of Limited Partnership, and did
not even bother to find out about the agreeme~s from
the partners. (R. 306, 331. ____ -------- Ab. 18, 22). Mr.
Beal admitted that he found thousands of dollars in
errors in the records including "net errors in overstated
9
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income of $38,000." (R. 335-336. Ab. 22-23). He
identified many errors noted in the defendant's accounting Exhibit 5-D, and said that Glendon E. Steiner
prepared Exhibit 5-D after the two of them had gone
over the records together. (R. 332-334. Ab. 22). As
shown by his pleading, plaintiff sought to recover the
unpaid unauthorized salary entries appearing in the
J. T. Chambers memorandum capital account.
The only accounting in evidence is defendant's
accounting, Exhibit 5-D. With respect to the salary
items, Mr. Steiner testified that he verified those figures
from the deposition of Mr. and Mrs. Chambers and
information furnished by Mr. Sims that on May 8,
1948, the partners agreed on n1onthly salaries of $400
for R. W. Sims and $350 for J. T. Chambers and that
said agreement was never changed. ( R. 1343-1347.
Ab. 161). While plaintiff now tries to dispute the
veracity of his own statements given on deposition, and
the trial court found that the salary "arrangement" of
$400 for Sims and $350 for Chambers "never became
operative," by the pretrial order and by Exhibit 3-P
the plaintiff acknowledged the correctness of the sum
of $2,507.16 as the ba]ance due to Mary Lois Fors as
heir-at-law to the limited partner L. H. Sims. As shown
in Exhibit 5-D, the only way that figure could possibly
be computed was to recognize the agreed monthly salaries of $400 for Sims and $350 for Chambers. By implication, at least, the plaintiff and cross-defendant
acknowledged that those figures 'vere right for purposes
of determining the unpaid capital account of Mary Lois
Fors. While plaintiff concedes that the defendant's
accounting is correct for ascertaining the amount due
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and owing to i\lrs. Fors, plaintiff seeks to dispute the
premises for such determination and to claim the benefit
of the unauthorized salary entries, which is strange
reasoning indeed.
Counsel for plaintiff "grasps for straws" in citing
Federal Revenue cases which hold that every partner
is charged with knowing what is on the partnership
records and what is omitted from the records. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 charges each partner
with such knowledge, for tax purposes only. Plaintiff
avoids mentioning that all of the partnership returns
were signed by J. T. Chambers and none of them by
R. W. Sims, so that Sims could not be charged with
actual knowledge of the gross errors or inconsistencies
or fictitious profits.
Since there is no evidence of any "practice of the
partners" to "recognize claims for salaries," it is difficult to understand why plaintiff refers to paragraph 6
of his complaint which alleges that "The practice of
the partners has been to recognize claims for services"
either by a-making payment or giving credit therefor~
and thereafter to divide net profits equally between
plaintiff and defendant." (R. 2, 1760. Ab. 230). If
there was a valid agreement between the general partners for salaries, neither partner had any occasion to
make any "claim" to a bookkeeper or to any other
employee. Furthermore, a "claim for salary" would
require the claimant to state a specific amount, which
would be inconsistent with the trial court's disposition
of the case by allowing "reasonable compensation" to
plaintiff and "denial of compensation" to defendant.
Since there was no payment of any salary, there was
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no "practice of making payment" of "claims for salary."
Plaintiff did not know he was ever credited with any
salary until1959. That was after this controversy arose.
Plaintiff made no claim for any of the unauthorized
salary entries appearing in the records until July 1959.
This is not a case where one partner devotes his
full time to the business and acts as "managing partner"
and the other partner devotes no time to the business.
In this case both partners rendered personal services,
and Sims was the recognized "head of the company"
and Mr. Chambers testified that it was agreed on May
8, 1948, that "every important decision should be referred to" Sims. (R. 886. Ab. 103). It was admitted
that Sims never violated his agreements. (R. 279-280.
Ab. 15). Nor is this case like two of the cases referred
to in the Brief of Plaintiff where a partner says he will
not perform his services to the partnership unless he
receives compensation for his services. Mr. Chambers
could not have rendered services in reliance on being
paid the unauthorized salary entries made in his memorandum capital account when he said he did not know
about those entries.
Counsel for plaintiff points to no competent evidence which could possibly show an "implied agreement" to compensate plaintiff for his service and deny
defendant compensation for his services. The rule is
that an implied agreemnt that one partner should receive compensation for his services must be established
by clear and satisfactory evidence. See Baker v. McGrane_, 198 Wis. 512, 224 N.,V. 737.
The trial court erroneously treated the violation
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of Mrs. Chambers' fiduciary duties in making the unauthorized entries in favor of her husband as the very
basis for the abortive "implied agreement" to allow
plaintiff "reasonable compensation" and to deny defendant any cmnpensation except what Mrs. Chambers
as an employee arbitrarily decided to "allow" her employer.
POINT 2.
THERE IS NO COMPETENT PROOF
THATTHEPARTNERSEVERCONSENTED
TO ANY MODIFICATION OF THEIR
AGREEMENTS OR EVER AGREED ON AN
UNEQUAL DIVISION OF PROFITS.
Point I of plaintiff's brief states: "PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS lVIAY BE MODIFIED
BY IMPLIED AGREEMENT OR ACQUIESCENCE." We are not concerned with some academic
question whether partners can modify their agreement.
The question is, Did the partners (as distinguished
from a bookkeeper or some other employee) decide on
modification of the partnership agreements? If they
did, how, when and in what particulars did the partner.~
actually accomplish a modification?
Before introduction of any evidence, the trial judge
summarized plaintiff's contention that "the practice
has so modified the original agreement that there is in
effect little of the original agreement to guide us."
Planitiff's counsel approved that statement. (R. 281.
Ab. IO). It was conceded by the court that "an unauthorized act of a bookkeeper is not binding upon the
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partners." (R. 285. Ab. 12). Since plaintiff inferred
an "adoption" by the partners, the court correctly held
that in order to have an "adoption" by the partner.Y
it "must be concurred in by both partners." (R. 282.
Ab. 11).
Throughout his brief plaintiff makes repeated arguments to the effect that the partnership agreement was
"modified by the practice," but none of the citations
to the record show that the partners ever decided on any
modification. Instead of offering evidence of "modification" by the partners of their agreements, plaintiff
merely presented evidence of unauthorized undisclosed
acts and omissions of plaintiff's wife, who was the trusted
record-keeper.
Sub-point "A" of Point I of plaintiff's brief is
that aThe Partnership Agreement of May 8, 1948,
provides for compensation before division of profits.-'-'
Compensation to whom? On page 13 plaintiff argues
that "reasonable under the circumstances" "as provided
in Paragraph XII of the Limited Partnership Agreement is the agreement of the parties upon which the
trial court relied." The court did not .follow Paragraph
XII at all, but contradicted the express language
thereof by Finding of Fact No. 11: "Paragraphs XII
and XIII of the partnership agreement contemplate
reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for his services
to the partnership." The court also created an "implied
agreement" of "reasonable compensation for plaintiff"
and "no compensation for defendant" except such
amount as plaintiff's wife had decided to "allow" him.
Paragraph XII quoted on page 12 of plaintiff's
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brief does not state that "plaintiff shall be entitled to
reasonable compensation" nor that "defendant shall
be denied compensation.'' It states that the general
partners (defendant and plaintiff) "shall be entitled
to compensate themselves for their services as an expense of operation of the business before computation
of profits.n It requires both general partners to deterInine the amount of their compensation. If they desired
compensation for their services, they were required to
compensate themselves as an expense of operation of
the business, and it had to be done in any accounting
period before profits were computed. Otherwise such
compensation could not have been used as an expense,
nor used in computation of profits. The agreement did
not say "reasonable compensation to be determined by
the court." It specified that the partners might compensate themselves, but as a protection to the limited
partner it limited them "to the extent that such compensation ... is reasonable under the circumstances."
On page 19 of his brief plaintiff makes the unfounded charge that "Defendant has attempted to
distort the testimony" of both Mr. and Mrs. Chambers
with respect to the subject of monthly salary of $400
for Sims and $350 for Chambers. Plaintiff also argues:
"The Court found that there was a conversation on May 8, 1948, at which salaries of $400.00
and $350.00 per month were discussed. Mr.
Chambers testified that his conversation took
place months earlier when Exhibit 20-P was prepared for Farmers State Bank (R. 899), and
he didn't ever testify that the amounts agreed to
were $400.00 and $350.00 ... "
Plaintiff did not testify that the discussion of $400
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per month for Sims and $350 for Chambers took place
"months earlier when Exhibit 20-P was prepared ·"
Upon interrogation by his counsel at the trial
plaintiff Chambers testified: "I do not now recall any
conversation between me and Mr. Sims of $400 a month
for Mr. Sims and $350 a month for me." (R. 937. Ab.
107-108). He admitted that on deposition February
27, 1960, he did testify that there was a discussion about
salaries on May 8, 1948 "in order to compute or determine the profit or the portion of the profit that L. H.
Sims would be entitled to receive." Chambers acknowledged that it wa~ agreed that he would receive a salary
of $350 per month and R. W. Sims would receive a
salary of $400 a month. Chambers also volunteered,
"His [Sims'] was higher," and he admitted that Sims'
agreed salary was $50 per month higher than Chambers'
salary. Plaintiff said, "Yes, I agreed to it." He further admitted that it was the "only salary agreement"
ever made with respect to the partnership. (R. 874.
Ab. 101). Mr. Chambers then stated that the bookkeepers (not the partners) later "changed" that agreement, but he testified that "he never said anything to
the bookkeepers about salaries." (R. 787. Ab. 102).
Although Mr. Chambers read over his deposition with
his attorney and made corrections to other portions of
his deposition, he never corrected the quoted portions.
(R. 875. A b. 101).
On further interrogation by Mr. Bird, plaintiff
represented to the court that he was"threatened" at the
time of taking the deposition. (R. 936. Ab. 107).
Chambers later admitted that the purported "threatening remark by Mr. Sims" did not occur during his depo-
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sition, but a weelt: after it was concluded. (R. 966-969).
A b. 109). Defendant tendered proof that plaintiff did
not hesitate to answer or to refuse to answer questions,
and that in refusing to answer questions plaintiff made
remarks which indicated that he was not frightened nor
intimidated; for example he said, "I won't waste any
time-unnecessary questions." (R. 1501. Ab. 183-184).
The trial judge said: "As I understood Mr. Chambers'
testimony, he claimed statements in his testimony were
made under the influenc of a threat. Now it appears
that the threat was not made during his testimony~ but
after his testimony was concluded.n (R. 1507. Ab. 184).
The representation that he testified to a salary agreement of $400 for Sims and $350 for himself under the
influence of a "threat" was palpably false, and destroyed
his credibility.
Paragraph XIII of the Certificate of Limited
Partnership specifies that Sims and Chambers were
then "equal partners." As stated in Baston v. Drummond~ (Ark.), 249 S.W. 547:
"In the absence of any contract on the subject,
neither partner would be entitled to charge anything by way of salary for his services; but if
they were to be paid, and there was no express
contract in regard to the sum to be paid, the presumption would be that they were to receive the
same payment, as they ·were equal partners ... "
Paragraph XIII does not relate to compensation
for personal services, but relates to partnership "interests'' and division of profits. However, on page 12
plaintiff says that "Paragraph XIII contemplated
that the compensation might be unequal." Such paragraph does not so state:
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''That the General Partners at the present time
are equal partners and shall share equally in the
profits; providd, that their interest shall be_ readjusted as they make additional contributions
to the partnership in property, money, or services, or by adjustment of property values by
mutual agreement." (Italics added.)
Plaintiff heretofore has stated that the plaintiff
and defendant were "treated as equal partners," and
even alleged in the complaint that there was an equal
division of profit "after salaries." The proof shows
that no salaries were ever paid to either partner. Although Mrs. Chambers made a number of secret entries
in favor of her husband, she never made any entry
which purported to show that Mr. Chambers was entitled to some special advantage under paragraph
XIII. She was conscious that defendant R. W. Sims,
not J. T. Chambers, was the partner who made substantial additional contributions.
J. T. Chambers testified that on May 8, 1948, he
agreed to "devote full time" to the partnership business, whereas R. W. Sims only agreed to devote part
time (R. 879. Ab. 102). Just how could Chambers possibly increase his full time contribution? Sims was the
only partner who could increase his service contribution.
In the Brief of Plaintiff there are unfounded
remarks that Sims "left the ready mix business in 1948
and went out to !(earns" (pages 20 and 33), and that
"he never got back on the payroll" until 1959 (page
18). The unwarranted inference is that defendant
breached his agreement and ceased to perform services
to the partnership and that he was not entitled to com-
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pensation. It was stipulated that R. W. Sims never
violated his agreements, and that he performed services
each and every year and the findings so indicate. (R. 279~80, 882, 910. A b. 10, 102, 105).
Plaintiff's invalid
argument infers that R. W. Sims as "head of the company" had to apply to Mrs. Chambers, an employee,
to "get on the payroll." Mrs. Chambers' own testimony
refutes plaintiff's strange argument.
Mrs. Chambers testified that starting in July 1948
Mr. Sims was trying to line up a big job at Kearns
"so that we could have the concrete orders for it." (R.
504. Ab. 52). Her testimony shows that Mr. Sims did
not discontinue his services to the partnership "when
he went to Kearns," but got the concrete business for
the partnership there in 1949 and 1950. She also admitted that Mr. Sims on behalf of the partnership went
out to various projects and took charge of pouring of
concrete if there was any sizeable job; and if other
problems came up which she thought were important
they were taken up with Sims. (R. 627-628. Ab. 70).
Plaintiff neglects to n1ention that Mrs. Chambers testified that the salary of R. W. Sims was always "fixed"
higher than that of her husband because Sims knew
more about the business. (R. 604-605. Ab. 65). Mrs.
Chambers knew that because of the business ability
of her brother, his skill and "know-how", his part-time
services as "head of the company" were worth more
to the partnership than the full-time services of her
husband, who did not possess such skill and who previously had been employed as a laborer in Sims' gravel
pit.
Plaintiff's argun1ent overlooks the fact that not-
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withstanding the salary of Sims was always fixed higher
than the salary of plaintiff Chambers, without authority
Mrs. Chambers as trusted record-keeper decided to
omit Sims' salary from the records after July 1948
and to credit plaintiff with unauthorized figures which
substantially included what should have been credited
to Sims. She credited only $4,500 "salary" to Sims,
who was entitled to the higher amount, and she credited
$93,350 or 21 times more to her unsuspecting husband.
Mrs. Chambers' probably did not prepare the
memorandum in Exhibit 21-D until 1955, when she
back-dated salaries for her husband all the way to 1949.
Said memorandum, prepared without the knowledge
or consent of the partners, contradicted the memorandum Exhibit 22-D which she prepared in May 1949
which showed equal salaries for both general partners;
and also a memorendum which she had in 1951 showing
a salary of $4,778.60 for her husband which was stricken
by agreement in March 1952. Such figure of $4,778.60
likely included the $4,200 salary for Mr. Chambers
which had been agreed on between the partners on May
8, 1948. ( R. 667-668. A b. 7 4-75) . Those unauthorized
manipulations which credited salary to Chambers and
none to Sims, contradicted part of Exhibit 44-D, the
original partnership return for the year ending September 30, 1949, in which no salary was shown for Mr.
Chambers, but a salary of $2,980.18 was shown for
R. W. Sims. That salary was eliminated by an amended
return which stated, "This figure does not include salary
to any partner." No "practice" by the partners which
could modify their salary agreement was ever shown.
Substantial additional contributions in funds to
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the partnership were made by Sims. As shown by Exhibit 5-D the contention that plaintiff left substantial
amounts of his share of the profits in the partnership
are grossly exaggerated. In 1950 Chambers was overdrawn. He was overdrawn again in 1959. In contrast,
I-t. W. Sims made very substantial contributions. He
furnished $18,600 in 1955 and paid another $5,000 to
the partnership in 1956. Mrs. Chambers as a salaried
agent of Sims in his sand and gravel business from
1947 to 1955 collected $19,293.89 owing to Sims from
customers other than the partnership and deposited
those funds in the partnership bank account, as shown
in Exhibit 1-P. Between 1950 and 1952 there was a
grand total of $33,759.20 owing to Sims from the partnership for sand and gravel which was not entirely paid
until 1955. Mrs. Chambers used those funds of Mr.
Sims as working capital in the partnership, according
to her own testimony. (R. 976-978. Ab. 110). She
never issued a check to either Mr. Chambers or to Mr.
Sims at any stated interval, but upon their requests
as they needed money.
~

The contributions made by Mr. Sims after 1948
were substantial and real. The unauthorized "salary"
credits secretly entered on behalf of Mr. Chambers by
his wife, did not add one cent to partnership assets nor
pay any bills.
There is no evidence of any modification of paragraph XII by the partners. Plaintiff neither pleaded
nor proved any right to preferential treatment under
paragraph XIII; but proved that R. W. Sims was the
only partner who made any substantial contributions
to the partnership after May 8, 1948.
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POINT 3.
THE COU.RT DID NOT FIND THAT
DEFENDANT "ACQUIESCED" IN N 0 R
"ADOPTED" ANY OF THE UNAUTHORIZED BOOKKEEPING ENTRIES MADE BY
MRS. CHAJ.\tiBERS, AND THE EVIDENCE
REFUTES THE CLAIM OF "ACQUIESCENCE" AND "ADOPTION."
Plaintiff argues "acquiescence" in a number of
places in his brief. Plaintiff's Point II is that "THE
PARTIES ADOPTED THE BOOKS AND RECORDS AS THEY WERE KEPT." His sub-point
"B" is that aDefendant was amply notified of the
salaries practices and acquiesced therein."'"' There is no
competent proof of either ':acquiescence" or "adoption"
of any of the bookkeeping manipulations. They were
carried on behind the backs of the general partners and
nondisclosure was a necessary part of the operation.
Although Mrs. Chambers had numerous conversations
with her brother R. W. Sims, who was the recognized
"head of the company," at no time did she ever reveal
to her brother what was going on behind his back. She
even concealed her unauthorized operations from her
husband whom she sought to unjustly enrich by the
flagrant breach of her fiduciary duties to Sims.
Anything Mrs. Chambers wanted her brother to
know about, she told him, and the fact that she did not
tell Mr. Sims what she was doing behind his back shows
that she did not want him to kno-w.
On page 18 of the Brief of Plaintiff it is claiined
that the trial court made "findings that the parties
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acquiesced in and adopted the practice of crediting the
plaintiff with the salary for his full-time services to the
partnership (R. 149 and 186) ". Such unfounded claims
are argued also on pages 13, 24, 35 and mentioned on
page 50. There was no finding of either "acquiescence"
or "adoption." Finding of Fact No. 10 is inconsistent
with the clai1n of "acquiescence" and it negatives the
clai1n of "adoption," for the court found that by reason
of the relation of confidence and trust between defendant Sims and his sister Margaret Chambers a "more
complete disclosure" was required of the salary credits
entered in the Chambers' capital account before such
credits could become binding on defendant.
The very nature of that finding indicates that the
entries complained of by defendant were unauthorized
and not sufficiently disclosed and that Sims did not have
adequate knowledge of them to enable him to acquiesce
in them, and that they were therefore not binding on
him. It was impossible to "acquiesce" in them or "adopt"
them without full knowledge of all material facts, and
the evidence clearly shows that Mrs. Chambers made
no disclosure whatsoever.
There is no plea of "acquiescence" nor of "ratification" nor of "adoption." No such claim was asserted
at the pretrial for the obvious reason that counsel for
plaintiff was conscious of the fact that the Agreement
for Dissolution of Partnership dated August 17, 1959,
negatives the possibility of "adoption" of or "acquiescence" in any of the unauthorized bookkeeping entries
and o1nissions. By said written agreement, Exhibit
10-D, the plaintiff and defendant agreed on a tentative
equal division of the assets of the partnership and ac-
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counts receivable, without payment of salary to either
subject to the right of each partner to partnership accounting, and the right of each party to litigate
his disputed claims. By said written agreement executed
by both plaintiff and defendant ""Sim,s asserts that the
books and records of the partnership he has recently
examined do not conform to the partnership agreement.n
That completely refutes all of the contentions in the
Brief of Plaintiff that defendant "acquiesced" in or
that he "adopted" the salaries shown in the books. By
paragraph 17 of that instrument the parties specifically
agreed:

partner~

"17. There are a number of items which are

unsettled and which are presently in dispute or
questioned by one party or the other, which remain
to be settled by negotiation, partnership accounting, by court proceedings or otherwise. The unsettled and disputed items include actual contributions to capital, services rendered to the partnership including claims asserted by Margaret S.
Chambers, partnership salaries~ questions of unauthorized salaries~ failure to accredit salaries~
withdrawals made by partners~ balance of capital
accounts~ back charges on costs of materials furnished by the Sims companies, claims of Thelma J.
Sims, and alleged preferential rights to withdrawal
of funds prior to division of remaining assets, questions of :r:ights to interest on any or all of such
items, and other matters, including questions of
prope1· bookkeeping and record-keeping. n (Italics
added).
On August 17, 1959, plaintiff in writing acknow24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ledged that there had been no acquiescence in nor adoption of the challenged bookkeeping entries, and that the
items still in dispute included "partnership salaries,
questions of unauthorized salaries, failure to credit
salaries, . . . and . . . questions of proper bookkeeping
and record-keeping." Plaintiff attempts to dispute the
plain language of a written instrument, to which he is
a party, by unfounded argument.
The very nature of "acquiescence" or "ratification"
(or "adoption") necessitates knowledge of all of the
material facts. As stated in Holmes v. Hrobon~ (Ohio
App.) 103 N.E. 2d 845 at 869, "acquiescence" embraces all elements of assent to the act or conduct
with full knowledge, while "ratification" is confirmation
after the act with full knowledge. Mrs. Chambers as
well as her husband refuted his argument of "acquiescence" or "adoption," by the following specific admissions, which also conclusively demonstrate that she acted
without authority, secretly, contrary to the will of the
partners, and that Sims never "acquiesced" in her
manipulations after he found out about them, but demanded correction:
She had a duty to keep correct records. ( R. 663664. A b. 7 4) . She knew Sim.s trusted her implicitly in
record-keeping. (R. 700. Ab. 78). She knew bookkeeping was "way out of his line." (R. 665. Ab. 74).
Plaintiff himself testified that he was not familiar with
the books. He said, "That wasn't my job." (R. 914.
Ab. 106). She was aware that Mr. Chambers testified
that it was agreed on lVIay 8, 1948, that he would devote
his full time to the partnership business, but that Sims
would devote only a portion of his time. (R. 879-881.
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Ab. 102). She knew her husband had worked as a
laborer in the Sims gravel pit, and that R. W. Sims
had vastly superior business ability, skill and "knowhow." Mr. Chambers testified that it was agreed that
R. W. Sims would be considered "head of the company''
and that "every important decision should be referred
to him/' (R. 886. A b. 103). She knew Sims "was the
recognized head" of the company. (R. 623. Ab. 69).
Mrs. Chambers admitted, '"'"We always fixed Rowe,s
salary a little more because we figured he knew more
about that particular business than my husband did.,
(R. 604-605. Ab. 65). The term "fixed" means to "decide definitely; settle, determine." Following the meeting of May 8, 1948, she made some memoranda or work
sheets "with respect to salaries of Mr. Chambers and
Mr. Sims." (R. 606-607. Ab. 66). It would have been
impossible to have made a memorandum on salaries of
the two partners if those salaries had not been definitely
established. She never had any discussion with either
Sims or Chambers about changing those salaries. (R.
607. Ab. 65). She destroyed the original salary memorandum, and made other salary memoranda which do
not harmonize with each other, Exhibits 21-D and 22-D.
At no time did Mr. Chambers tell her to keep a
record of hours spent by the partners, but he refused
to keep a record of his time. Mr. Chambers told her that
a there wasn,t any need for either partner to keep a
record of his time., (R. 1868. Ab. 250-251). She knew
that neither Mr. Siins nor her husband ever authorized
her to compute any salaries for them on an hourly basis.
It was her decision to do so. (R. 621-622.
68).
Sometime in 1954 or 1955 Mrs. Chambers prepared

Ab.
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the Ineinorandum in Exhibit 21-D, whereby without
authorization of any kind she attempted to put a salary
for her husband on an hourly basis. She used in some
places on Exhibit 21-D the same hourly rate for both
her husband and Mr. Sims. After the name of Sims,
instead of putting an amount, she put a question mark.
(R. 621. Ab. 68). Without mentioning anything to
either partner, she and Russell Evans decided to omit
any salary for Mr. Sims on the records for the period
following July 1948. (R. 703. Ab. 80). Regardless of
the services she knew Mr. Sims performed, she made
no entry as salary for him after July 1948. (R. 623.
A b. 69) . She knew that a "salary" of $4,778.60 for
Mr. Chambers for 1951 had been stricken by agreement
when Mr. Sims found out about it; but some months
later or several years later she secretly put a salary
of $7,200 in the Chambers memorandum account and
back-dated it to 1951, without saying anything to any
person. (R. 654-658, 702. A b. 72-73, 79-80).
Mrs. Chambers blamed Russell Evans for the
salary entries of $11,700 in 1955 in favor of Cha1nbers,
but she never told Mr. Sims about them. (R. 701-702,
708-710, 714, 715, Ab. 79-81). Successive entries were
made without consulting either Mr. Sims or her husband. (R. 715. Ab. 81). She knew uthese entries had
gone on for a period of years before there was any discovery made of those entries.n (R. 721. Ab. 83). She
said that when l\t1r. Sims found out about those entries
for her husband and lack of entries for Sims, Mr. Sims
became very angry. (R. 715. Ab. 82). When Sims
learned of the bookkeeping irregularities in October
1958, he demanded correction of the records. Instead
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of making correction, behind his back she made another
entry of $11,700 for her husband for December 31,
1958.

Mrs. Chambers testified that salary entries were
made once each year, at "income tax time." She explained, al would discuss it with Mr. Evans and then
forget it.n (R. 835. Ab. 97). She not only forgot to
tell her brother about such unconscionable activities,
but she even forgot to tell her husband. After Sims in
October 1958 found out about the shocking bookkeeping
irregularities, he asked her whether "Tal knew anything
about those salary entries on the books," and she told
Sims that she did not think her husband knew about
them. She said that "Tal had never had a check to know
he was getting a salary." (R. 826. Ab. 95-96). Mr.
Chambers was then asked a day or two later as to his
recollection of salaries. He told Sims, "My salary was
less than Leonard's and your salary was more than
Leonard's, and the figures that I have in my mind are
$350 a month for me and $400 a month for you." There
never was any discussion between the partners about
changing salaries. (R. 1052-1053. Ab. 123-12~).
At first Mr. Chambers disclanned any responsi.,.
bility for the unauthorized entries. As late as July
1959 he said he told Mr. Sims that prior to that time he
did not know that he had ever been credited with any
salary on the books, and he told Mr. Sims he did not
know what the entries were. (R. 922-923. Ab. 107).
As proof positive that Mr. Sims did not "adopt the
books and records as they were kept" by Mrs. Cha1nbers,
after Sims as "head of the company" failed in his efforts
to obtain correction by Mrs. Chambers, who had an
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admitted duty to keep correct records, Mr. Sims appealed to his co-partner John T. Chambers for correction of the records in July 1959. Mr. Chambers
testified that at that time he told Mr. Sims he '"'"was not
going to stand for any changes in the books because it
reflected on Margarefs honesty.-'-' (R. 922. Ab. 107).

Plaintiff's attempt to take advantage of his wife's
unauthorized bookkeeping entries and manipulations,
made it impossible for defendant to continue in business
with plaintiff. Under their Agreement for Dissolution
of Partnership dated August 17, 1959, Exhibit 10-D,
none of the unauthorized salary entries were paid, and
the parties agreed tha t"Sims asserts that the books and
records of the partnership ... do not conform to the
partnership agreement." That document shatters the
claim of "acquiescence" and "adoption."
POINT 4.
"ACQUIESCENCE" OR "ADOPTION"
COULD NOT ARISE FROM DISCUSSIONS
OF NON- SALARY ITEMS, NOR F R 0 M
STATEMENTS WHICH OMITTED ALL REFERENCE TO SALARIES, NOR FROM ANY
ALLEGED "NEGLECT" OF SIMS TO EXAMINE RECORDS; AND THE ARGUMENT
OF PLAINTIFF CONTRADICTS THE RECORD.
In arguing that Sims was "amply notified" of,
and "acquiesced" in, the admittedly unauthorized conduct of his sister, plaintiff makes the unique contention
that failure of Sims to find out what was going on until
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the fall of 1958 was due to his own "neglect" to examine
records "always available to him." Plaintiff attempts
to shift the blame onto defendant, and thereby divert
attention from Mrs. Chambers' flagrant breaches of
her fiduciary duties to Sims, and also to obscure plaintiff's inequitable conduct as a partner in 1959 in trying
to take advantage of his wife's undisclosed prejudicial
conduct.
Just how available to Sims was the information
of what was going on behind his back? Some partnerships records were at the office, some in a file, some in
a desk drawer, and some were even in a box in the deep
freeze. ( R. 806. A b. 92) . Notwithstanding Exhibit
10-D dated August 17, 1959, required Mrs. Chambers
to deliver all of the partnership records to Sims by
September 15, 1959, she admitted that in July 1959
she removed some documents from the partnership
records and they were kept in either her possession or
in the custoq.y of her attorney. She said she knew that
in 1959 Mr. Sims was anxious to get all of the partnership records, and her own ad.Inissions show that she
frustrated him with respect to at least some of them.
(R. 581-584, 587. Ab. 61-62). That shows she did not
want Mr. Sims to have access to some of them at least.
On April 18, 1961, after defendant had made an additional demand for surrender of the partnership documents, Mr. Bird delivered 13 certificates of title (offered
by defendant as Exhibit 92-D). Mr. Bird offered the
following excuse for his clients: ""\'V have a lot of files
in our place of business. In our opinion we have disgorged all from our files that defendant is entitled to."
He then offered to allow Mr. Evans to look at those

e
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files, but refused to permit either Mr. Sims or his accountant or his attorney to do so. (R. 1843-1844. Ab.
243-244).

If Mrs. Chambers forgot about the records she
put in the deep freeze, how would Mr. Sims know where
to look, particularly when he was unfamiliar with the
records? Mrs. Chambers breached her fiduciary duties
to her brother to keep him properly informed, by refraining from disclosing what she had done.
Since the unauthorized entries were not made until
1955, even if Mr. Sims had actually examined the records prior to 1955 he could not have found any of the
entries which now appear for the years 1949 to 1954,
for they were backdated. Exhibit 22-D made in May
1949 showing an equal salary for both partners, is
inconsistent with Exhibit 21-D which Mrs. Chambers
made about 1955 when she decided to "compute" partners' salaries on an "hourly basis", and omit all salary
for her brother for the period following July 1948.
Exhibit 21-D was found among some miscellaneous
papers, about one month before trial.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's attempts to charge Mr.
Sims with the duty of finding out about the bookkeeping
manipulations without any one telling him, Mrs. Chambers herself, who was responsible for keeping accurate
records, at first disclaimed any responsibility for the
salary entries of $11,700 made in favor of Mr. Chambers
from and after 1955. She blamed Russell Evans, and
Evans blamed her. She testified, "I didn't know about
any of these items until this controversy arose, because
I argued so strenuously about it and I thought there
would probably be a change made." (R. 783. Ab. 90).
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She said she made a notation of "wrong" in the ledger
which she later erased. (R. 786. Ab. 90). How could
she have made such a notation or have argued strenuously about it, if she did not know 1 Although she said
she thought there would be a "change made," she did
not make any strenuous efforts to correct the records
or any efforts to notify Mr. Sims about such wrongful
entries.
A classic example of the unfounded attempt of
plaintiff to claim that Mr. Sims knew about the bookkeeping irregularities for a long time, appears on pages
25 and 26 of the Brief of Plaintiff, wherein plaintiff
infers that Robert E. Shirley, a C.P.A., in 1956 "discussed appropriate matters with Mr. Sims_, including
salaries. (Ab. 41-44, R. 439-44, 447, 453, 461, 465).
Although, when he was pressed to recall a specific conversation in which salaries was specifically discussed,
he was unable to do so (Ab. 45, R. 465) ." Page 45 of
the Abstract shows that Mr. Shirley's testimony refutes
the claims of plaintiff:
"I cannot state definitely what I showed Mr.
Reimann at his home other than the letter (Exhibit 12-P). I knew that ~Ir. Reimann was
making inquiry as counsel for Mr. Sin1s. (R.
467).

"I recall saying that Tal Chambers had left
a portion of his share of the profits in the business
and had not drawn out all of his share of the
profits and there would have to be some adjustInents by reason of that. The subject of salaries
was never discussed at the meeting betzt'een Mr.
Reimann and me. (R. 464). I don"'t 1·emember
w~eth:r the subje~t of salaries was ever discussed
with either Mr. Sims or Mr. Reimann.
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"I do not recall a specific conversation in which
salaries to Mr. Chambers was discussed. That is
what I would like to have the record show. (R.
465).

"When I said I discussed income with Mr.
Sims I refer to the fact that I told him what the
figure was as to his share of the income. I don"'t
have any recollection that I exhibited any partnership return to him.-'"' (R. 466).
Mr. Shirley was called as a witness for plaintiff
and cross-defendant. He admitted that he knew Mr.
Sims was "not familiar with bookkeeping entries or
bookkeeping methods." (R. 468. Ab. 46). Mr. Shirley
was hired by Ray Liljenquist in 1956 to make an examination of the partnership records for Mr. Liljenquist
as a prospective purchaser of partnership assets. (R.
413. Ab. 36). Mr. Shirley expressly stated that he never
informed either defendant or his attorney of any bookkeeping irregularities. He had a conversation with Mr.
Reimann as attorney for Mr. Sims on March 16, 1956.
Mr. Shirley said he told Mr. Reimann athat it was
pretty hard to find things on the books the way the records are kept."'"' Mr. Shirley further told Mr. Reimann
that he adid not find anything irregular on the books."'"'
(R. 446-447). Ab. 42). Just how would Mr. Sims be
alerted to any of the irregularities by the report of such
an investigation by a C.P.A. 1 That would be sufficient
to lull Mr. Sims into a sense of security since he had
implicit trust and confidence in his sister. Since it was
"pretty hard" for even a C.P.A. to "find things on the
books the way the records are kept", just how much
chance would a person like Mr. Sims who was unskilled
in bookkeeping have to find anything? Mr. Shirley did
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not disclose to either Mr. Sims or his attorney that he
had made no inquiry to ascertain whether proper entries
had been made in the ledger. (R. 445. Ab. 42) ·
The J. T. Chambers memorandum capital account
appears in about the middle of the ledger, Exhibit 1-P.
It appears under the tab, "Proprietorships." There is
no tab on "Salaries." There is no index nor any chart
of accounts in the ledger. An inexperienced person
unfamiliar with bookkeeping, particularly the hybrid
system used by Mrs. Chambers, would have a hard
time to stumble onto the sheet where the unauthorized
entries appeared. That sheet had a "semi-honorable
burial" in a mislabeled part of the ledger. If a person
started at the beginning of the ledger he would become
so confused and discouraged that he likely never would
reach the middle. When these facts were brought out
in the testimony of Glendon E. Steiner, Sr., Mr. Bird
himself proceeded to cinch the point by the following
explanation concerning the ledger, Exhibit 1-P:
"MR. BIRD: This book is not made for any
ordinary layman to examine. * * * This is an accountant's record, a bookkeeper's record and made
for his use. If anybody examining his books can't
find anything, he can ask the bookkeeper. It isn't
intended that anyone who walks in can pick up a
set of books and find what he is looking for without help." (R. 1284. Ab. 153).
At pages 26 to 28 plaintiff argues that discussion
between Sims and his sister in March 1956 shows that
he was aware of what was on the books. The discussion
related to a proposed sale which never materialized.
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Mr. Bird so admitted. (R. 534. Ab. 57). The entire
conversation was incompetent. It related to how the
assets would be divided in the event of a proposed sale.
Exhibits 16-P and 17-P were incompetent. Exhibit
17-P was altered out of the presence of defendant.
Salaries were not mentioned in the negotiations according to Mrs. Chambers' own admissions. Mrs. Chambers represented to her brother that the figure of
$56,856.15, which appears on Exhibit 17-P, was the
difference between the plaintiff's capital account and
Sims' capital account at that time. Mrs. Chambers was
very careful not to show Mr. Sims those capital accounts, but tried to get him into an agreement on the
division of the assets. She falsely represented that Mr.
Sims had "overdrawn" his account. She knew the books
did not show Mr. Sims overdrawn, and Mr. Bird said,
"We will stipulate that the books don't show that." Mr.
Bird said, "Apparently they do not show any overdraft
at any time." (R. 729,731-732. Ab. 84). Mrs. Chambers
first testified that she told her brother that "I couldn't
see why it should be so different, only that our salaries
and our profits had been plowed back into the company
whereas he had been having to take his for expansion
of his pit operation." (R. 519. A b. 54). On cross examination when asked about her statement made on direct
examination about "salary" she said, "I don't know
that the word 'salaries' should be in there." (R. 729.
Ab. 84). Her own qualification of her testimony shows
that she did not discuss salaries with her brother during
that negotiation on a sale proposal. Furthermore, notwithstanding the efforts of Mr. Bird to contradict the
record, Mr. Sims testified that the words "wages M. &
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T." opposite the figure of $56,856.15 were not put on
Exhibit 17-P during that conversation nor in his presence. Sims testified that she told him that "Tal's portion
of the profits and her wages were plowed back into the
business, and that made that difference between us."
(R. 1080-1081. Ab. 128). Mr. Bird cut off further
interrogation as to the alteration of Exhibit 17-P out
of the presence of Mr. Sims by stating that Mrs. Chambers put those words "wages M. & T." on later. (R.
1081. Ab. 128).
Counsel for plaintiff refers to a number of documents which were prepared by Mrs. Chambers, Mr;
Evans, Mr. Beal and others. Contrary to the record he
claims that those documents were either delivered to
Mr. Sims or exhibited to him. On page 26 he refers to
Exhibit 15- P which was a statement prepared for Mr.
Chambers, but never exhibited to Mr. Sims. Such
statement contradicts the records. Said statement is
utterly ridiculous for it shows distribution of all profit
for 1950 to 1952 to Mr. Chambers, including the amount
on Exhibit 23-D which was owing to ~Ir. Sims for sand
and gravel. 1\'Irs. Chambers said she did not know if
she had Exhibit 15-P with her when she talked to Mr.
Sims. (R. 520. Ab. 55).
On page 28 plaintiff argues that Exhibit 18-P "was
another annual statement which was presumably delivered to Mr. Sims since that was the purpose of preparing them, according to Mr. Evans (Ab. 175, R.
1437) ." Contrary to such assertion ~Ir. Evans said he
had no recollection that any copy was ever forwarded to
Mr. Sims. (R. 1437. Ab. 175). Mr. Sims never received
such document. It never could have been prepared for
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~Ir.

Sims, for it disputes not only the figures Mrs.
Chambers had put in the ledger in 1955 and backdated
to 1949 to 1951, but it also contradicts the statement
attached to the partnership tax return for the period in
question in Exhibit 44-D. It could not have been a
statement for an original partnership return, for the
original return for the period ending September 30,
1949, showed a salary of $2,980.18 for R. W. Sims and
none for J. T. Chambers. Such return was later amended
to show no salary for either partner, with the following
notation: "This figure does not include salary to any
partner." (See Exhibit 44-D). It is significant that
Exhibit 18- P was not in the partnership records, but
in the possession of Mrs. Chambers.
On page 28 plaintiff argues that Exhibit 21-D
"ties in with the conversations that all of the parties
and Mr. Reimann had with Mr. Beckstrom (Ab. 121
and 136, R. 1039 and 1132) .'' There were no conversations stating thatJ. T. Chambers should receive a
salary and Sims should be denied a salary. Mr. Beckstrom prepared a form of capital account which Mrs.
Chambers admits is attached in Exhibit 21-D. The
Beckstrom capital account did not include a salary
to either partner. As shown by Exhibit 21-D which
was secretly made in 1955 without any authority, Mrs.
Chambers devised salary figures for her husband for
periods of 1949 to 1954 and back-dated them to the
years in question, and she even computed a "salary"
for her husband on an "hourly basis" when she knew
her husband had refused to keep a record of his time
and had told her it was not necessary for either partner
to keep any record of his time. On Exhibit 21-D yellow
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memorandum sheets Mrs. Chambers based an inflated
salary for her husband in part on "overseeing" the Sims
gravel pit, which could not be chargeable to the partnership-a service which Chambers himself denied that he
ever rendered.
On page 29 plaintiff contradicts the record by
saying that "This testimony indicates that the whole
method of keeping the capital accounts was discussed
with the defendant in connection with 21-D and his
suggestion was carried out." There never was any discussion about Exhibit 21-D for l\1r. Sims never saw it
until a month before the trial, and Mrs. Chambers herself repeatedly admitted that she did not discuss any
of those "salary items" with Mr. Sims. Plaintiff contradicts the testimony of his wife. Plaintiff also said
that "Exhibit 23-D reflects this", when it is utterly
inconsistent with Exhibit 23-D. Plaintiff then contends:
"It is significant that on this tax return when first prepared there was a salary only for John T. Chambers
and in the amount of $4,778.60 for the year 1951." It
certainly is significant, for that figure does not agree
with any figure in the ledger. :Furthermore, although
that figure was stricken by agreement of the parties
after Mr. Sims and his attorney learned about it, so that
no salary was shown for J. T. Cha1nbers for 1951, some
months later or several years later in defiance of that
agreement Mrs. Chambers had a new "salary" of
$7,200.00 secretly entered and back-dated to 1951,
which was $2,421.40 in excess of the figure which had
been stricken by agreement made on March 14, 1952.
At the trial counsel for plaintiff said, "We will stipulate
that neither of them knew about it at the time." (R.
1047. Ab. 122).
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Exhibit 26- P was prepared behind the back of R.
W. Sims after an adjustment of $11,722.93 in his favor
in the price of sand and gravel had been agreed on
between Sims and the Chambers. Exhibit 26-P was
incompetent. Contrary to the argument of plaintiff on
page 29 there was no agreement to deduct $2,500 or
any other sum from that settlement figure. Instead of
entering the $11,722.93 in the records as the argreement
required, as soon as Sims' back was turned, Mrs. Chambers had only $9,196.97 entered as owing for sand and
gravel. There was deducted an amount in excess of
$2,500 without authorization and $2,500 was falsely
noted on the records as "salary". Mr. Evans, who made
the entries under the supervision of Mrs. Chambers, did
not testify that Mr. Sims had anything to do with such
abortive exhibit. He admitted that the "item of $2,500
represents the adjustment made in the price of sand
and gravel. It was not really a salary at all." (R. 1453.
Ab. 176). There was no excuse fDr such bookkeeping
manipulation. If it had been salary it would have been
a charge against the partnership, and not a charge
against R. W. Sims nor against his sand and gravel
account. Mrs. Chambers tried to shift the blame onto
Mr. Evans. (R. 816. R. 93). No wonder the court exclaimed: "Well, it is beyond the understanding of the
court." (R. 1455. A b. 177). Mr. Bird offered the untenable excuse that "it took the form of salary as a
means of making the sand and gravel adjustment."
There was no occasion to resort to some bookkeeping
1nanipulation after the figure of $11,722.93 had been
agreed on as the amount owing to Sims. The correct
figure should have been entered in the books.
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On page 25 plaintiff argues that defendant received copies of the annual statements, Exhibit 6-P.
Not even Mrs. Chambers claimed he did. None of those
annual statements shows a salary to Mr. Chambers,
and only two of them refer to "capital a~counts." Mr.
Sims denied that he received any of them. Instead of
testifying that those statements were delivered to Mr.
Sims as represented in the plaintiff's brief, Mr. Evans
testified that he did not know if copies were delivered.
(R. 1437. Ab. 175). Exhibit 7-P contradicts Exhibit
1-P. There was no proof of delivery of either the original or a copy. The only statements ever delivered to
Sims consisted of Exhibit 6-P-A, which show the
charges made against him for checks issued to him or
for the sand and gravel business from the partnership,
his drawing account, and credits for the total amount
of sand and gravel. (R. 569, ________ Ab. 61). Mrs.
Chambers gave Mr. Sims statements in writing, Exhibit 6-P-A, which did not show any salary to Mr.
Chambers. She gave him only the information she
wanted him to have.
The annual profit and loss statements did not show
any salary to either partner. Even if they had been
delivered to Sims, which they were not, they would not
have constituted "accounts stated", nor have been "binding" on Sims. See Caveney v. Caveney_, 234 Wis. 637,
291 N.W. 818. Chambers could not have performed any
service in reliance on any of the salary entries in the
books, nor in reliance on omission of salary for Sims
in the books; for plaintiff did not know about the unauthorized bookkeeping activities of his wife.
On page 20 plaintiff makes the unwarranted claim
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that Sims "knew when he signed Exhibits 63-P and
64- D that he had left the business and gone out to
Kearns and that he was not going to receive any salary
while he was there." The document was immaterial
and irrelevant, for there is not one word which states
that Sims had left the partnership business, nor is there
anything mentioned about salaries of partners, nor
anything which intimates that Sims was not to receive
any salary while he was at Kearns, nor that Chambers
was to receive a salary. Sims conducted business for
the partnership at Kearns. The documents constituted
a pledge by Sims to his sister Mrs. Margaret S. Chambers of his partnership assets as sec1u·ity for a loan which
Mrs. Chambers admittedly never consummated. Mr.
Bird stated in arguing his motion to reopen the case to
introduce Exhibit 63-P that "It appears on its face
to constitute a sort of pledge. We have never regarded
it as being an effective pledge." (R. 1656. Ab. 211). See
the affidavit of R. W. Sims which states that Mrs.
Chambers never completed the loan and represented
that she returned all copies to him. (R. 132-137). Ab.
220-225) . Mrs. Chambers testified on November 3,
1960, that she returned the document and "never used
it in any way against my brother." (R. 792. Ab. 212).
Counsel for plaintiff mentions various conversations between Mr. Sims and Mrs. Chambers and between Mrs. Chambers and Mr. Sims' attorney, but
fails to show that the subject of salaries was ever discussed, except on March 14, 1952, when it was agreed
that the salary of $4,778.60 shown on Exhibit 23-D
would be stricken. On page 34 plaintiff refers to a discussion at a church dinner in 1957 at which it is claimed
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that Mrs. Chambers said the capital accounts were
"unbalanced." lVIrs. Chambers made various excuses
for not telling Mr. Sims about the unauthorized salary
entries, but on this occasion she had a "captive audience" and she had every opportunity to confess to Mr.
Sims what had been going on behind his back, but she
again cautiously refrained from disclosing the facts
which she had a solemn duty to disclose.
Plaintiff has found it necessary to contradict the
record in many instances in his unwarranted argument
of "acquiescence." The record shows that Sims did not
have a full knowledge of the facts essential to acquiesce
in or adopt the wrongful manipulations made in the
books by Mrs. Chambers. As stated in New Y ark Life
Ins. & Trust Co. v. Kane~ 45 N.Y.S. 543, at 547,
"acquiescence" imports active consent, and cannot be
inferred from acts which are doubtful or ambiguous.
Plaintiff argues that on various occasions Sims had the
opportunity to investigate, but the fact is tha.t Mrs.
Chambers had the fiduciary duty to disclose all important facts to lVIr. Sims without an investigation because
he trusted her implicitly. As soon as the plaintiff learned
of his wife's wrongful conduct he had a fiduciary duty
to aid his co-partner to obtain correction of the records.
Plaintiff tried to profit from his refusal to do his duty
to his co-partner,and to take advantage of the unauthorized salary entries and omissions.
POINT 5.
CONTRARY TO ARGUMENTS OF PLAINTIFF, "REASONABLENESS" 'VAS NOT A
PROPER ISSUE, BUT IT WAS THE UN-
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FOUNDED PREMISE F 0 R CANCELING
THE CONTRACTS JVIADE BY THE PARTIES
AND SUBSTITUTION OF A PURPORTED
"IMPLIED AGREEMENT" CREATED BY
'1'1HE COURT TO WHICH THERE NEVER
WAS ANY ASSENT .
On page 39 of his brief plaintiff states that "it was
error for the court to consider further evidence on the
issue of reasonableness," but then proceeds to attempt
to uphold the admitted error. Plaintiff says, a1 t was
within the pleadings and Pre-Trial Order/J but there
never was any such pleading and nothing was stated
in the pre-trial order. On page 42 plaintiff· refers to
the balance sheet figure which was taken from Exhibit
3-P. One look at that clearly indicates that the question
of reasonableness was not involved for each party
claimed specific salaries in specific amounts. As stated
by plaintiff's witness David N. Beal, Exhibit 3-P was
made up, exhibited and used at the time of the pretrial conference as a "starting point." Mr. Beal said
they "were not trying to make any determination as
to which claim was right or which was wrong. We were
trying to show the differences specifically where they
were in salaries, and Exhibit 3-P illustrates thos'e differences." That exhibit was made as a result of a conference between Mr. Beal as accountant for plaintiff
and Glendon E. Steiner as accountant for the
defendant. (R. 1893-1894. Ab. 255-256). Thus, it is
clear that "reasonableness" was not an issue at· the
pre-trial and was never mentioned because the accountants set forth the specific salary claims.
Plaintiff says that uDe.fendant suggested at the
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opening of the trial that it be eliminated."'"' Defendant
contended all along that "reasonableness" was not an
issue. After the court said to Mr. Bird that he understood "from your statement now that reasonableness of
services will not enter into the lawsuit" (R. 289, Ab.
14), Mr. Burton pointedly asked:

" ... is it Mr. Bird's contention that the practice on which he said he is relying is one that
the parties have by some practice established an
agreement that there will be a reasonable amount
allowed for services 1
"MR. BIRD: Oh, no, no." (R. 290-291. Ab.
14.)

The court said that Mr. Bird was going to show
"that there was a practice and that practice established
a specific salary and that the matter of reasonableness
is not an issue in the case."'"' (R. 292, Ab. 15).
Under sub point "C" plaintiff argues '"'"The possibility that both might fail in their claims of specific
compensation 'Was recognized."'"' Plaintiff says, "Both
parties expected to succeed in establishing their claimed
specific salaries." If the court was right in ruling that
neither party proved his claim of a specific salary agreement, under the statute neither party became entitled
to a salary and the judgment should be reversed and
judgment should be entered in favor of defendant
against plaintiff and his wife because the Chambers were
overdrawn. The trial court held that both plaintiff and
defendant failed to prove an agreement for specific
salaries. Both partners performed personal services,
but the trial court could not entertain any evidence
that the services of one partner were of greater value
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than the services of the other partner. Instead of denying salary to each partner as such determination would
require, the court decided that the plaintiff should
have "reasonable compensation" for his services and
defendant should be "denied compensation" for his
services. The court thus struck down the agreements
which the partners made and substituted one which was
utterly inconsistent with the claims of either party for
which there never was any assent or consideration.
On page 45 to 48 plaintiff makes the contention
that aThe Court had the right to hear the further issue
and complete the case.n Plaintiff infers that the oourt
could create an issue which was inconsistent with the
theories of both parties and give the plaintiff another
"day in court" while denying defendant the same privilege. Contrary to the argument of plaintiff the Rules
of Civil Procedure do not "encourage the District Cou):"t
to do what was done in this case." The cited rules do
not declare that after a plaintiff has failed in his proof
that he should be permitted to have a new trial on an
entirely inconsistent theory. None of the rules give the
courts authority to cancel a contract made by the parties
and to substitute sorne "'"implied agreement~ which is
utterly inconsistent with the claims of both parties.
Plaintiff then says that "'1f reasonableness was a
proper issue~ the Courfs decision was supported by evidence and is sound.n It was not a proper issue, and there
was no competent evidence and the decision is inequitable. Plaintiff then disregards just about everything in
the Brief of Defendant andAppellant by saying that defendant "makes no attack on the Findings of Fact
relative to reasonableness of the salary awarded to the
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plaintiff." Plaintiff overlooks defendant's brief, and
particularly pages 37, and 40 to 44.
The court actually dispensed with any proof of
"reasonable" compensation for 1949 to 1951 and generously allowed plaintiff the full amount of those unauthorized back-dated salary entries, although there
were partnership losses and no profits. On April 18,
1961, the trial judge said:
"I intend to adopt the salaries claimed through
1951, and from there on out, it is necessary for

me to find what is a reasonable amount of compensation under the circumstances." (R. 1842.
Ab. 243).
There is not even a finding of "reasonableness"
for 1949 to 1951. There was no competent proof offered
by plaintiff of "reasonable compensation" for the years
1952 to 1959 and plaintiff points to none. The trial
court at the request of plaintiff used the hourly rate
for the man at Magna who was classified as an "operating engineer," without proof of comparable activities.
Although plaintiff testified to "long hours," he admitted
that he had an agreement with Sims on May 8, 1948,
that he would devote "full time" to the business while
Sims, who was made "head of the company," was only
required to devote a portion of his time. Plaintiff admitted that he spent part of his time at Smith's Inn,
and that he claimed "reasonable compensation" for the
time he spent there. (R. 1855-1856. Ab. 247). He neve1·
made any record of his time because he told Mrs.
Chambers that there "wasn't any need for either partner
to keep a record of his time." (R. 1868. Ab. 251). l\Irs.
Chambers adrnitted that she testified on deposition thai
she personally knew that Mr. Chambers went to Smith's
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Inn quite a few times during the day for coffee breaks,
and that she told him to go there. She said he would
state, "I'm going to the corner. If anything comes up,
call me there." She said, "'"And he practically had a privale line to Smith"s.n (R. 2206-2207. Ab. 297).
The evidence showed that everything which Mr.
Chambers testified he did could be done in 4Vz to 5
hours in the summer and about 2 hours in the winter,
by persons without previous experience. Mr. Chambers
had an extra man with him in the hatching plant. The
business operated just as well when Mr. Chambers was
away as when he was there, and after dissolution of
the partnership a reduced portion of the business at
th eHolladay plant operated at less cost per concrete
yard. (R. 1899-1953. Ab. 257-266). Mr. Evans, who
testified for plaintiff, indicated Mr. Chambers spent a
lot of time needlessly, and that the business sometimes
operated better when he was away. (R. 205.9-2061. Ab.
277).
When there was a cement shortage from trucks
hauling in cement, Mr. Sims endeavored to get the evidence of short-weights. Mr. Chambers agreed to have
all trucks weighed after Mr. Sims had the new scales
installed. Mr. Chambers w·eighed only 12 loads, 10 of
which had a shortage, but he falsely reported to counsel
for Mr. Sims that there was no shortage. Th~re w:as a
shortage of 2,900 pounds in the 10 loads as shown in
Exhibit 75-D. (R. 2133-2140, 2261-2266. Ab. 285-286,
308). The partnership suffered a loss of approximately
$28,000 over a period of years through the indifference
of Chambers and his false representations· to his copartner.
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Sims rescued the partnership from some of th
financial problems which Mr. Chambers created b;
breach of his agreement with his co-partner. Sims wa
instrumental in having his attorneys settle a $45,001
controversy over cement shortages and alleged unpai<
accounts, without paying any part of the dispute<
$25,000 claim of a cement company. See Exhibit 81-P
Sims saved the partnership thousands of dollars whicl
Mr. and Mrs. Chambers wanted paid on an unjust claim
Sims as "head of the company" never neglected tc
perform his agreements. It was stipulated that he neve1
breached his partnership agreements. There was m
equitable basis for cancelation of any contract with hi~
co-partner or the substitution by the court of an in·
consistent "implied agreement" to favor Chambers witb
"reasonable compensation" in the aggregate amouni
of more than soro of the wrongful bookkeeping entries
and to deny Sims any right to compensation excepi
such amount as Mrs. Chambers as an employee acting
without authority had secretly decided to "allow" her
employer Sims.
POINT 6.
HAVING FAILED TO RENDER HIS PRE·
TENDED "ACCOUNTING" UNTIL AFTER
SUIT WAS FILED, PLAINTIFF CANNOT
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY UNAUTHOR·
IZED ENTRIES BY A PLEA OF ANY STAT·
UTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiff cites no cases to support his plea of th~
statutes of limitations, nor any facts ,vhich could pos·
sibly make any statute applicable. The rule is that tht
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statutes of linutations do not commence to run until
either termination of the partnership relation or the
filing of a proper partnership accounting, which plaintiff neglected to do. Plaintiff's pretended "accounting"
was not even filed until several months after suit was
filed.
See l(imball v. McCormick~ 70 Utah 189, 259 P.
313, Davis v. Alemander~ (Wash.), 171 P. 2d 167, and
Reindel v. Reindel~ 253 Mich. 680, 235 N.W. 861 at
862.

The trial court erred in dismissing defendant's
counterclaim, but not in ruling against plaintiff on his
plea of the statutes of limitations.
CONCLUSION
Neither the facts nor the law support the contentions of plaintiff, nor justify the judgment entered by
the court. The judicially created "implied agreement"
inconsistent with the written and oral agreements of the
partners, was prejudicial error.
As pointed out in the Brief of Defendant and
Appellant R. W. Sims, the judgment should be reversed and vacated in its entirety and defendant should
have judgment against the plaintiff and cross-defendant for their overdraft.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY and BURTON
By WILFORD M. BURTON, and
By PAUL E. REIMANN
Attorneys for Defendant and Appel·
lant R. W. Sims, No. 9554, and Re·
spondent in No. 9556.
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